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CASE COMMENT
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: IS THE FSIA
INEFFECTIVE, OR IS IT POLITICS AS USUAL?, Samantar v.
Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010)
Michael Gutman*

I. FACTS
Petitioner, Mohamed Ali Samantar (Samantar), was a high-ranking
government official in Somalia in the early 1980s,' and served as its
Prime Minister from 1987 to 1990.2 In 2004, Respondents, native
Somalians and members of the Isaaq clan, 3 filed suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 and the Alien Tort Statute.4 Respondents sought
damages for the alleged torture and extrajudicial killings committed
against them and their family members by the Somali military while
Samantar was in command of that force.5 Samantar filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that he was entitled to immunity under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 (FSIA).6 The District Court, finding it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction,7 granted Samantar's motion to
* The author is a rising third year law student at the University of Florida, Levin
College of Law. The author would like to thank his friends, family, and girlfriend who have
provided him invaluable guidance and inspiration throughout the writing process.
1. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2282 (2010) (noting that Petitioner was
initially the first Vice President and Minister of Defense of Somalia from 1980-1986).
2. Id.
3. Id. The Isaaq Clan was comprised of wealthy, educated Somalian citizens, who were
systematically persecuted by the military force governing Somalia in the 1980s. Id.
4. See id. at 2282-83. For further discussion, see also Jordan J. Paust, This History,
Nature, and Reach of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 FLA. J. INTI'L L. 249 (2004).
5. See id at 2282. Respondents also claimed Petitioner knew, or should have known,
about the alleged abuse while he abetted the military forces in committing the abuse. Id.
6. See id. at 2283, 2283 n.2. The FSIA reads in relevant part,
[s]ubject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2010).
7. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2283. "The Act, if it applies, is the 'sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court."' (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989)). Id. at 2286.
125
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dismiss.8 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and
remanded the case, 9 and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 0
The Court affirmed, and held that the FSIA did not govern the
determination of immunity for an individual official acting on behalf of
a foreign state."
II.HISTORY
Initially, the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity was governed
by general common law principles.12 At common law, in order to obtain
immunity, foreign governmental representatives had to petition the State
Department for a "suggestion of immunity."' 3 Once a suigestion was
granted, the courts would relinquish their jurisdiction. Without a
"suggestion of immunity," a foreign official could not be certain that he
or she was free from prosecution in the United States.'
Before 1952, the State Department had a policy of grantin virtually
all petitions that were filed by friendly sovereign countries. In 1952,
the State Department moved to a "restrictive" theory of sovereign
immunity.' 7 Under, the "restrictive" theory, foreign sovereigns were
granted immunity for public acts, while immunity for commercial
activities was withheld. 8 Despite adherence to the restrictive theory,
inconsistent application of foreign sovereign immunity remained.' 9
Throughout the 1970s, Congress became increasingly concerned that
8. Id. at 2283.
9. Id. at 2283-84. While noting the majority view among the circuit courts, that the FSIA
did govern the immunity of an individual in his official capacity, the Court of Appeals held that
"based on the language and structure of the statute, the FSIA does not apply to individual
foreign government agents like [petitioner]." Id. at 2284 (quoting Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d
371, 381 (4th Cir. 2009).
10. Id. at 2284.
11. See id. at 2282.
12. See, e.g., id. at 2284.
13. See id.
14. See id. The same process was usually followed when an individual acting on behalf of
a foreign state asserted a claim of immunity. See id. at 2284-85.
15. See id. at 2284; see also Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("In fact, however, the courts treated such 'suggestions' as binding determinations,
and would invoke or deny immunity based upon the decision of the State Department").
16. See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2285.
17. Id.
18. Id. ("[u]nder this theory, 'immunity is confined to suits involving the foreign
sovereign's public acts, and does not extend to cases arising out of a foreign state's strictly
commercial acts."') (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983)).
19. Id. (explaining that "political consideration sometimes led the Department to file
'suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity would not have been available under the
restrictive theory."')(quoting Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690 (2004)).
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the State Department was granting or withholding "suggestions of
immunity" for political reasons, and not according to the common
law.20 In 1976, Congress reacted by passing the FSIA: "[t]he principal
change envisioned by the statute was to remove the role of the State
Department in determining immunity." 2 1 Unfortunately, since its
inception, the judiciary has struggled to interpret the scope of the FSIA
in relation to the plain language of the statute.2
An early case interpreting the scope of the FSIA was Chuidian v.
PhilippineNational Bank.2 3 In Chuidian,Vincente B. Chuidian sued the
Philippine National Bank and Raul Daza, an official of the Philippine
government, when Daza instructed the bank not to honor a letter of
credit issued to Chuidian. 24 The court struggled with the issue of
whether Daza, as an official acting on behalf of a forein state, was
entitled to foreign sovereign immuniy under the FSIA. While Daza
argued he was entitled to immunit , 2 Chuidian claimed Daza was not
individually covered by the Act.2 The government 2 8 contended that
Daza was not covered under the FSIA because he was an individual and
not an association or corporation, but was nevertheless immune under
20. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1100. A report from the House of Representatives outlined
Congress's concern:
From a legal standpoint, if the Department applies the restrictive principle in a
given case, it is in the awkward position of a political institution trying to apply
a legal standard to litigation already before the courts . . . . From a foreign

relations standpoint ... [a] private party who deals with a foreign government
entity cannot be certain that his legal dispute with a foreign sovereign will not
be decided on the basis of nonlegal considerations through the foreign
government's intercession with the Department of State.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8-9 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6607).
21. Id
22. Compare In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding that the FSIA governs immunity for officials acting in their official capacity), and
Velasco v. Gov't of Indon., 370 F.3d 392, 398-99 (4th Cir. 2004) (same), and Keller v. Cent.
Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002) (same), and Byrd v. COFINO, 182 F.3d 380
(5th Cir. 1999) (same), and El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(same), with Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that individual
immunity is not governed by the FSIA).
23. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990)
24. Id. at 1097.
25. See id. at 1099.
26. Id. Daza claimed that he fit the definition of an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state" which was afforded immunity under the FSIA. Id.
27. See id
28. The government appeared by way of a "Statement of Interest of the United States."
See id.
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"general principles of sovereign immunity." 29 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held Daza's immunity was governed by
the FSIA. 3 0 The court reasoned that due to the Act's ambiguity, limiting
the application of the FSIA to individuals would be inconsistent with
the goals of Congress, and a grave "unannounced departure from prior
common law." 3 ' As such, individuals acting in their official capacity did
constitute an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under
section 1603(b). The reasoning of the Chuidian court became the
majority view interpreting the FSIA.3 3
Upsetting the apparent consensus among the U.S. district courts and
courts of appeals, the Seventh Circuit handed down a much different
interpretation of the FSIA in Enahoro v. Abubakar.34 In Enahoro,
plaintiffs filed a tort action against General Abdulsalami Abubakar, a
former head of state of Nigeria.35 The plaintiffs alleged, among many
other counts, that Abubakar was behind the extra udicial killings and
torture endured by them or their family members. Akin to Chuidian,
the Enahoro court was faced with the issue of whether the FSIA applied
to individuals linked to the actions of foreign governments.3 7 However,
in opposition to Chuidian, the Enahoro court held the FSIA did not
govern the determination of immunity for Abubakar. The court,
undertaking a textual analysis of the FSIA, concluded the Act was not
meant to apply to individuals. 39 According to the Enahoro court, "[i]f
Congress meant to include individuals acting in the official capacity in
the scope of the FSIA, it would have done so in clear and unmistakable
29. Id. The "general principles of sovereign immunity" referred to by the court are those
found in the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 66(b). See id.
30. Id. at 1103.
31. See id. at 1101. In its reasoning, the Court mentioned three problems it had with
limiting the scope of the FSIA. First, a narrow reading of the Act would encourage artful
pleading, because attorneys would take advantage of the Act's ambiguity and choose the more
beneficial law. Second, a bifurcated system for foreign sovereign immunity would be counter to
Congress's goal of removing the State Department from the determination of immunity. Finally,
there was no known authority that recognized common law principles of foreign sovereign
immunity in light of the FSIA. See id. at 1102-03.
32. Id. at 1103.
33. See generallyIn re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 83 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding the FSIA governs immunity for officials acting in their official capacity); Velasco v.
Gov't of Indon., 370 F.3d 392, 398-99 (4th Cir. 2004) (same); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277
F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002) (same); Byrd v. COFINO, 182 F.3d 380, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1999)
(same); El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same).
34. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005).
35. See id. at 879. Abubakar "was Nigeria's head of state for the last year of the junta's
reign." Id.
36. Id.
37. Seeid.at881.
38. Id. at 882.
39. See id. at 881-82.
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III. INSTANT CASE

In the instant case, the Supreme Court definitively resolved the split
among the U.S. circuit courts of appeals by holding that the FSIA did
not govern Samantar's claim of immunity.41 The Court focused its
analysis on the plain language 42 and legislative history of the statute. 43
In so doing, the Court concluded that an individual acting in an official
capacity, could not constitute a "foreign state" within the meaning of the
statute.
Consequently, an individual could not claim immunity
pursuant to the FSIA.45
The Court specifically focused on the meaning of the phrase "agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state" defined in section 1603(b). The
FSIA defines that phrase as an "entity" which possesses the
characteristics of one of the three subdivisions laid out in section
1603(b)(1)-(3). 4 7 The Court noted that "'entity' typically refers to an
organization [or corporation], rather than an individual."48 Also, the
Court mentioned that there are other provisions of the FSIA in which
40. Id. at 882.
41. Samantarv. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292 (2010).
42. The FSIA reads in relevant part:
(a) A "foreign state" . . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in
section 1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country.

28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2010).
43. See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2285-92.
44. Id. at 2289.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 2286-87.
47. Id. at 2286. See also FSIA, supranote 42.
48. Id. at 2286.
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Congress expressly mentions "officials" when linking their acts to those
of a foreign state. Yet, Congress chose not to include "officials" in the
definition of "foreign state" provided by section 1603(a).5 0 According to
the Court, such exclusion meant that Congress did not intend the FSIA
51
to extend immunity to individuals acting on behalf of a foreign state.
To supplement its textual analysis, the Court reviewed some of the
legislative history of the FSIA.52 Among other things, the Court looked
at reports from the House of Representatives that demonstrated an intent
to leave diplomatic immunity outside the scope of the FSIA.13 The
Court viewed as significant the fact that the State Department believed
its role in determining individual immunity was unaffected by the
FSIA. 54 In light of this information, the Court concluded that individual
immunity was not something Congress sought to address with the FSIA;
rather, "[t]he FSIA was adopted to address 'a modem world where
foreign state enterprises are every day participants in commercial
activities."' 5 5
The Court examined Samantar's claim that the FSIA should be
interpreted in connection with prevailing international law,5 6 as well as
his argument that foreign relations and protection of American officials
in other countries would be undermined if the Court did not adopt his
reading of the statute.5 7 The Court also noted the concern of the Courts
of Appeals that limiting the scope of the FSIA would encourage artful
pleading, and as a result make application of the FSIA optional. In
addressin these issues, the Court stressed the narrowness of its
holding. It explained, "[w]hether petitioner may be entitled to
immunity under the common law, and whether he may have other valid
defenses to the grave charges against him, are matters to be addressed
... on remand." 6 0 As such, the Court clearly contemplated that an
individual may still be entitled to foreign sovereign immunity, but that

49. Id. at 2288 (citing, inter alia, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(c) (Supp. 2009) (allowing suit
against a "foreign state" as well as "any official, employee, or agent" of a foreign country)).
50. See id. at 2287.
51. See id. at 2289, 2289 n.12.
52. See, e.g., id. at 2287 n.9, 2289 n.12, 2291, 2291 n.19.
53. Id. at 2289 n.12 (referencing H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprintedin 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610-11.
54. Id. at 2291 n.19.
55. Id. at 2291 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606).
56. Id at 2290 n.14.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2292.
59. Id. at 2292-93.
60. Id.
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the determination would be governed by common law principles.61

IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court could have deferred to the reasoning of the
Chuidian court, and the majority of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, and
concluded individual immunity was coextensive with foreign state
immunity. 62 It could have rejected the Enahoro decision as an
aberration.63 Instead, the Court chose to rely on the plain langage and
legislative history of the FSIA to narrow the scope of the Act.
The result of the Court's interpretation of the FSIA has been a
bifurcated approach to determining foreign sovereign immunity.6 5
Under this approach, individual immunity is decided in line with
common law principles, while "foreign state" immunity is governed by
reference to the FSIA.6 As such, foreign countries seeking immunity on
behalf of their officials are con elled to petition the State Department
for a "suggestion of immunity. Without such a suggestion, the district
court is left to decide if immunity exists.68
Interestingly, the resulting bifurcated approach runs counter to the
goal of Congress of removing the role of the State Department from the
immunity process. 69 The instant case exposed, albeit implicitly, the
flaws in the FSIA legislation. The opinion revealed that after reading
the plain language of the statute, the Court interpreted the scope of the
FSIA in a way that was contradictory to one of Congress's goals.
In light of the canons of statutory interpretation, it must be noted that
the Court's textual analysis of the FSIA is accurate and highly
relevant. 70 However, by overemphasizing the plain language of the
61. Id. at 2293.
62. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'1 Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990); see also In re
Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2008); Velasco v. Gov't of Indon.,
370 F.3d 392, 398-99 (4th Cir. 2004); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir.
2002); Byrd v. COFINO, 182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999); El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75
F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
63. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005).
64. Samantar,130 S. Ct. at 2289.
65. Cf id. at 2285 (explaining after the passage of the FSIA, it is the Act and not the
common law which governs the determination of "foreign state" immunity), with id. at 2292-93
(concluding Samantar may still be able to gain immunity under the common law).
66. See id. at 2292-93.
67. See id. at 2284-85.
68. See id. at 2284.
69. See id. at 2285.
70. See, e.g., Markovski v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 108, 110 (4th Cir. 2007) ("Under the most
basic canon of statutory construction, we begin interpreting a statute by examining the literal
and plain language of the statute").
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statute, the Court overlooked a significant factor in the creation of the
FSIA. Congress sought to codify the restrictive theory of immunity and
remove the State Department from the immunity process, so that there
would no longer be inconsistent awards of sovereign immunity.
However, after the Court's holding, there remains the possibility that
awards of immunity will continue to be politically motivated and
inconsistent. 72 Take for instance, a state-sponsored terrorist attack
carried out by an official of a foreign state. Under the Court's
interpretation of the FSIA, the state would automatically be immune
from prosecution, unless one of the exceptions of the FSIA applies.
However, the individual who carried out the attack would need to
petition the State Department for a "suggestion of immunity." 74 Because
there are political factors that may sway the State Department, the
official could end up being denied immunity, while the state that
sponsored the attack would be shielded from prosecution. Considering
the official was merely an agent of the foreign state, it seems unjust that
immunity could be awarded to one and not the other.
Finally, the Court correctly dismissed Samantar's claim arguing a
narrow reading of the FSIA would undermine foreign relations.7 ' The
Court also correctly dismissed Samantar's prediction that a narrow
interpretation would have a negative effect on awards of individual
immunity to American officials abroad. This is because individuals
acting in their official capacity will still be able to gain sovereign
immunity.7 7 The only difference is that individuals will have to seek
immunity through the pre-FSIA process, 78 while the determination of
"foreign state" immunity will be made strictly by the U.S. courts.7 9 In
the case of individual immunity, the same political implications will
exist now that existed before 1976. Moreover, the inconsistent awards
of immunity occuring pre-FSIA will continue to occur following this
case. Therefore, it was appropriate for the Court to bypass an analysis of
the effect its decision would have on international law and foreign
relations.8 0

71. See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2285.
72. See id. (because "political considerations sometimes led the Department to file
'suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity would not have been available under the
restrictive theory."') (quoting Republic of Austria v. Altmann 541 U.S. 677, 690 (2004)).
73. See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2285-86.
74. See id. at 2292-93.
75. Id. at 2289-90.
76. Id. at 2290 n.14.
77. Id. at 2292-93.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2285.
80. Id. at 2290 n.14.
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V. CONCLUSION
In essence, while the Court's textual analysis is admirable, the Court
falls short in failing to take into account some of the goals Congress
sought to achieve in enacting the FSIA. 8 Nevertheless, by interpreting
the FSIA through the plain language of the statute, the Court did expose
the mechanical and practical flaws of the legislation. 82 The Court did
not set out to criticize Congress. Still, this case may result in Congress
becoming aware of errors it committed while crafting the FSIA. The
complete ramifications of this case on international law are not yet
known. That being said, it would not be surprising if, in response to this
case, Congress amended the FSIA to more accurately reflect its goals.

+ 81. "The principal change envisioned by the statute was to remove the role of the State
Department in determining immunity." Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100
(1990).
82. See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2285-92.
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